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NOTES
IRS Denials of Charitable Status: A Social Welfare
Organization Problem
INTRODUCTION

Both charitable and social welfare organizations are exempt from
federal income taxation. 1 Subsection 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) exempts enterprises organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes,2 and subsection 501(c)(4) exempts
enterprises operated for the "promotion of social welfare." 3 While a
1. Despite being generally exempt from income taxation, see notes 2-3 infra and accompanying text, charitable and social welfare organizations are still subject to tax on certain "unrelated income." "[T)he unrelated business income tax only applies to active business income
which arises from activities which are 'unrelated' to the organization's exempt purposes. Of
course, if a substantial portion of an organization's income is from unrelated sources, the organization will not qualify for exemption in the first instance." B. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAXEXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 554 (3d ed. 1979) (footnote omitted). See I.R.C. §§ 50l(b), 511-14
( I982). See generally B. HOPKINS, supra, at 554-611.
2. I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) (1982). I.R.C. § 50l(a) (1982) grants the income tax exemption to
subsection 50l(c) organizations. The relevant text of subsection 50l(c)(3) reads:
(c) List of exempt organizations.-The following organizations are referred to in subsection (a) [I.R.C. § 50l(a) (1982)):
(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition,
. . . or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of
which inures to the benefit of any private holder or individual, no substantial part of the
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation . . . and which does not parlicipate in, or intervene in, . . . any political campaign
on behalf of any candidate for public office.
I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) (1982). While this provision lists a number of purposes other than charitable
alone, the Supreme Court recently held that to qualify for tax-exempt status under subsection
50l(c)(3) an institution must meet "certain common law standards of charity - namely, [the
institution] must serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established public policy." Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2026 (1983). Thus, this Note will refer to any
organization qualifying for tax-exempt status under subsection 501(c)(3) as "charitable."
The term "exclusively" as used in subsection 50l(c)(3) is interpreted to mean primarily,
Treas. Reg.§ l.50l(c)(3)-l(c)(l) (1959). See Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S.
279, 283 (1945) (holding that a substantial non-exempt purpose will destroy exemption). See
also B. HOPKINS, supra note I, at 152-57.
3. I.R.C. § 50l(c)(4) (1982). More specifically, "[c]ivic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare" are exempted from
income taxation by subsection 50l(c)(4) pursuant to I.R.C. § 50l(a) (1982). As with charitable
organizations,see note 2supra, the term "exclusively" in subsection 50l(c)(4) is interpreted to
meanprimarily. See People's Educ. Camp Socy. v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1964).
The term "civic" does not impose a condition in addition to the requirement that an organization operate for the "promotion of social welfare" to qualify for tax-exempt status under
subsection 50l(c)(4). See People's Educ. Camp, 331 F.2d at 932-33; Eden Hall Farm v. United
States, 389 F. Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Treas. Reg.§ l.50l(c)(4)-(a)(2) (1959). But see Erie
Endowment v. United States, 316 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1963) (denying social welfare status be-
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group may qualify both as a charitable organization and a non-political4 social welfare organization, 5 the Internal Revenue Service
(Service) has denied charitable status to these social welfare organizations in some instances. 6
cause activity not designed to accomplish community ends); Commissioner v. Lake Forest,
Inc., 305 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1962) (pointing to dictionary meaning of"civic" and requiring that
benefits be municipal or public).
4. To qualify for tax-exempt status, neither charitable nor social welfare organizations may
participate in political campaigns. Section 50l(c)(3) forbids charitable organizations to "participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political
campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office." I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) (1982). Social welfare organizations are likewise precluded from "direct or indirect participation or intervention
in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office." Treas.
Reg. § I.50l(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(ii) (1959). See also Rev. Ru!. 67-368, 1967-2 C.B. 194 (group that
rated candidates for public office on non-partisan basis denied status as a social welfare organization).
The law of trusts more readily accepts as charitable attempts to change existing laws than it
does support of political parties. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 374 comments j, k
(1959). Under the Code, however, charitable organizations are much more limited than social
welfare organizations in their ability to influence legislation. To qualify as charitable, an organization must not be engaged in "carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation" as a "substantial part" of its activities. I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) (1982); Treas. Reg.
§ l.50l(c)(3)-l(c)(3) (1959); see also Rev. Ru!. 67-293, 1967-2 C.B. 185 (social welfare organization denied status as charitable because of its legislative activities); B. HOPKINS, supra note 1,
at 256-59. This proscription on legislative activities is subject to certain exceptions. See I.R.C.
§ 50l(h) (1982). A social welfare organization, on the other hand, may attempt to influence
legislation. Treas. Reg. § l.50l(c)(3)-(l)(b)(ii), (iv), (v) (1959). Such social welfare organizations are known as "action organizations." See Treas. Reg.§§ l.50l(c)(3)-l(c)(3), l.50l(c)(4)l(a)(2)(ii) (1959).
Unless otherwise indicated, the term "social welfare organization" as used in this Note
does not refer to an action organization. For a further discussion on politically active social
welfare organizations, see notes 84-87 i,ifra and accompanying text.
5. An organization may qualify both as charitable under subsection 501(c)(3) and as social
welfare under subsection 501(c)(4). See Treas. Reg. § l.501(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(i) (1959); Rev. Ru!.
74-361, 1974-2 C.B. 159. In fact, the Treasury Regulations define the terms "charitable" and
"social welfare" by reference to each other. "Charitable" is defined by the regulations as
follows:
The term "charitable" is used in section 50l(c)(3) in its generally accepted legal sense
and is, therefore, not to be construed as limited by the separate enumeration in section
50 l(c)(3) of other tax-exempt purposes which may fall within the broad outlines of "charity" as developed by judicial decisions. Such terms include: Relief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of religion; advancement of education or
science; erection or maintenance of public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of
the burdens of Government; and promotion if social we(fare by organizations designed to
accomplish any of the above purposes, or (i) to lessen neighborhood tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice and discrimination; (iii) to defend human and civil rights secured by law;
or (iv) to combat community deterioration and juvenile delinquency.
Treas. Reg.§ l.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (1959) (emphasis added). Treas. Reg. § l.501(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(i)
( 1959) prescribes that a " 'social welfare' organization will qualify for exemption if it falls
within the [above] definition of 'charitable'."
6. The Service has not treated the categories of charitable organizations and social welfare
organizations as coextensive. Revenue rulings provide examples of instances where the Service
has approved social welfare status while denying charitable status. See, e.g., Rev. Ru!. 70-4,
1970-1 C.B. 126; Rev. Ru!. 66-179, 1966-1 C.B. 139; Rev. Ru!. 59-310, 1959-2 C.B. 146 (quoted
at note IO i,ifra ).
Revenue rulings are cited throughout this Note as evidence of the Service's interpretation
of the Code. According to Rev. Proc. 78-24, 1978-2 C.B. 503, reliance on rulings is proper.
This revenue procedure defines a "revenue ruling" as "an official interpretation of the Internal
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The distinction drawn by the Service between charitable and social welfare organizations is significant because the tax law grants
benefits to charitable organizations that do not apply to other
groups.7 The most valuable of these benefits is the deductibility for
income tax purposes of donations to charitable organizations. 8 The
Service has refused to extend this deduction to donations made to
social welfare organizations.9 This refusal seems inconsistent, however, with the position taken by some courts that social welfare orgaRevenue laws . . . and regulations, by the Internal Revenue Service . . . issued only by the
National Office and . . . published for the information and guidance of taxpayers, Service
officials and others concerned." 1978-2 C.B. at 505. Furthermore, this revenue procedure
states: "Revenue rulings do not have the force and effect of Treasury Department Regulations
. . . but are published to provide precedents to be used in the disposition of other cases, and
may be cited and relied on for that purpose." 1978-2 C.B. at 505.
In one of the revenue rulings cited above, the Service conferred social welfare status on an
organization formed to "[promote] the health of the general public by encouraging all persons
to improve their physical condition and of fostering by educational means public interest in a
particular sport for amateurs" of all ages. Rev. Ru!. 70-4, 1970-1 C.B. 126, 126. The Service
however, denied charitable status for the organization. In Rev. Ru!. 66-179, 1966-1 C.B. 139,
the Service ruled on the status of four garden clubs; two of the determinations are relevant for
purposes of this Note. One garden club was formed to instruct the public about horticulture
and to stimulate beautification of the area, and its activities were consistent with those purposes. Its membership was open to the public. A second garden club was identical to the first
except that a "substantial part of the organization's activities, but not its primary activity,
consist[ed] of social functions for the benefit, pleasure, and recreation of its members." 1966-1
C.B. at 140. The Service distinguished the two clubs on the basis of these social functions. The
first was judged charitable; the second was limited to social welfare status.
Congress recognized that charitable organizations can qualify as social welfare organizations and passed l.R.C. § 504 (1982) to prevent abuses of that option by charitable organizations that become politically active. See S. REP. No. 938 (Pt. II), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 83,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4030, 4107-08.
7. For example, l.R.C. §§ 312l(b)(8)(B) and 3306(c)(8) (1982) exempt charitable organizations from certain employment tax obligations.
8. Contributions to charitable organizations are deductible in computing the donor's income tax under I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B) (1982). Cf. l.R.C. §§ 2055(a)(2), 2106(a)(2)(A)(ii) (1982)
(corresponding estate tax provisions); I.R.C. § 2522(a)(2), (b)(2)-(3) (1982) (corresponding gift
tax provisions). Contributions to social welfare organizations, on the other hand, are not deductible. See I.R.C. § 170(c) (1982); see also Regan v. Taxation with Rep., 103 S. Ct. 1997,
2000 (1983); B. HOPKINS, supra note I, at 256; Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit
Organizations from Federal Income Tax, 85 YALE L.J. 299,347 (1976).
Eligibility for deductible contributions is advantageous to an organization because (in theory) it enables the organization to attract both a greater number of contributions and larger
contributions. The effective after-tax cost to the donor of deductible contributions is the gross
dollar amount discounted by a coefficient equal to the difference between one and the donor's
marginal tax rate. Non-deductible contributions of an equal dollar amount are not discounted
and thus are more expensive to the donor. See Taxation with Rep. v. Regan, 676 F.2d 715, 718
(D.C. Cir. 1982),revd. on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1997 (1983); Abortion Rights Mobilization,
Inc. V. Regan, 544 F. Supp. 471, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION ~ 7.01, at 142 (3d ed. 1982). The charitable organization stands to benefit in two
ways. First, if a donor has decided to give to an organization that happens to be charitable,
presumably he will give more to the organization than he would if it were not charitable because the effective after-tax cost of the contribution would be less than the nominal amount of
the contribution. Second, where a donor is otherwise indifferent as to which of two organizations to contribute to, an organization's charitable status would sway the donor in its favor.
See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 729-30 (1974).
9. See Rev. Ru!. 59-310, 1959-2 C.B. 146 (discussed at note 10 i'!fra).
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nizations serve the same purposes as charitable organizations and
therefore should be treated similarly under the tax law. 10
This Note argues that the courts and the Service should recognize
social welfare organizations as charitable and, consequently, contributions to such organizations should be tax deductible. Part I describes the Service's position and sets forth the statutory arguments
supporting it. Part II raises two objections to the Service's position:
(1) the distinction between social welfare organizations and charitable organizations lacks an adequate statutory justification, and (2)
this distinction produces unpredictable and arbitrary results. Pa~ III
10. See Consumer Credit Counseling Serv., Inc. v. United States, 78-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ~ 9660 (D.D.C. 1978); Monterey Pub. Parking Corp. v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 972
(N.D. Cal. 1970), offd., .481 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1973); Northern Cal. Cent. Serv. v. United
States, 591 F.2d 620, 626 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Peters v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 55 (1953); Turnure v.
Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 871 (1927).
In Monterey, a group of private businessmen formed a nonprofit corporation to build and
operate a public parking lot because the local government could not afford to support the
project. The Service contended that the corporation was neither a charitable nor a social welfare organization, advancing separate grounds for each contention. The Service asserted that
charitable status was improper because more than an "insubstantial" part of the organization's
acts was not in furtherance of an exempt purpose. The Service argued that social welfare
status should be denied because the corporation carried on a business similar to that of an
enterprise operated for profit. The court rejected these tests and held that the organization
qualified under both the charitable and social welfare exemption provisions. In so holding, the
court expressly disagreed with the Service's distinction between social welfare organizations
and charitable organizations, observing that "the distinction between the two subsections of
§ 501 is more apparent than real." 321 F. Supp. at 975. The court further noted that both
provisions and their accompanying regulations serve the same policy:
In short, the Regulations aim at discovering whether asserted civic or charitable ends are
but subterfuges for what is fundamentally a private enterprise. If they are not, the case
law under both subsections has made it clear that they will not destroy the exemption
claimed.
321 F. Supp. at 975 (citation omitted).
The Service issued a revenue ruling disagreeing with the result in Monterey in which it
argued that the private interests of the businessmen precluded qualification under either subsection 501(c)(3) or (4). Rev. Rul. 78-86, 1978-1 C.B. 151. This ruling did not, however, respond to the court's claim regarding the absence of any distinction between charitable and
social welfare organizations.
In Peters, the Tax Court pointed to a broad definition of "charity" that "embraces any
benevolent or philanth~opic objective not prohibited by law or public policy which tends to
advance the well-doing and well-being of man." 21 T.C. at 59. The court then held that the
taxpayer could deduct contributions to a recognized social welfare organization because "the
[donee], a nonprofit organization dedicated solely to the promotion of social welfare, should be
classified as charitable as that term is used in the statute . . . ." 21 T.C. at 59. This statement
suggests that all social welfare organizations are charitable. The organization was a foundation organized to furnish public swimming facilities for residents of a community who did not
have and could not afford private facilities, "to create and promote better understanding and
sympathy between the people of the community and to further the general welfare and health
of all of the people . . . ." 21 T.C. at 55-56. The Service had recognized the foundation as a
social welfare organization but denied it charitable status.
In response to Peters, the Service issued a revenue ruling concurring with the result but
stating that it "[did] not agree with the implication in that decision that every nonprofit organization dedicated solely 'to the promotion of social welfare' should be classified as charitable."
Rev. Rul. 59-310, 1959-2 C.B. 146, 148.
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proposes that all social welfare organizations 11 be accorded charitable status under subsection 50l(c)(3). This proposal would eliminate
the arbitrary results now reached by the Service, increase the social
benefits fostered by the income tax deduction for charitable contributions, and generally promote the policies underlying the favorable
tax treatment of charitable organizations.

l.

THE SERVICE'S APPROACH: DISTINGUISHING CHARITABLE
ORGANIZATIONS FROM SOCIAL WELFARE
ORGANIZATIONS

A.

The Service's Position

Although the Service has held that some social welfare organizations do not qualify as charitable organizations, 12 it has failed to articulate any specific standard for di.fferentiating between social
welfare activities and charitable activities. 13 In particular revenue
rulings, the Service has apparently relied on factors, such as the income of the intended beneficiaries, that distinguish specific forms of
similar activities. 14 However, the Service's reliance on such factors
has not been universal; the Service has declared, for example, that
11. That is, all social welfare organizations that do not attempt to influence legislation,
See note 4 supra.
12. See note 6 supra.
13. One article, which discusses the Service's rulings on aid to business, suggests that the
determination of whether or not an activity merits charitable or social welfare status might
hinge on whether "(t]he immediate beneficiary [of assistance is] . . . in need of charity."
Rainey & Henshaw, Exempt Organizations: A Survey, 19 S. TEX. L.J. 205,222 (1978), Where
the direct beneficiaries, in these revenue rulings owners of a business, are in need of charity,
assistance "confer[s] an immediate charitable benefit," id at 222, which is not the case where
direct beneficiaries have no such need. The authors then point to a subsequent ruling, Rev.
Rul. 76-419, 1976-2 C.B. 146, where charitable status was granted to an organization directly
assisting business investment in a depressed area. Because the immediate beneficiaries were
not "in need of charity," the authors suggest that "a new type of charitable organization ap•
pears to be emerging,'' which would be an exception to their theory. Id at 223. As a general
approach, this direct/indirect test, even if it were to remain valid, could at most be just one
factor in determining charitable status, since the Service has ruled other organizations charita•
ble where immediate beneficiaries were in no real "need of charity." See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 76147, 1976-1 C.B. 151 (community organization in higher income area); Rev. Rul. 69-257, 19691 C.B. 151 (organization awarding scholarship without regard to need); Rev. Ru!. 66-146,
1966-1 C.B. 136 (organization organized and operated for public recognition of outstanding
achievement).
14. Compare Rev. Rul. 65-299, 1965-2 C.B. 165, with Rev. Rul. 69-441, 1969-2 C.B. 115.
In Rev. Ru!. 65-299, the Service declared that a consumer credit counseling service was eligible
for social welfare status because its activities "contribute to the betterment of the community
as a whole." 1965-2 C.B. at 166. Charitable status was denied, however, because those "cligi•
ble for assistance are not limited to those who arc in need of such assistance as proper recipients of charity." 1965-2 C.B. at 166. In subsequent Rev. Rul. 69-441, the Service granted
charitable status to a similar organization that directly assisted only those with low incomes.
The Tax Court rejected the Service's determination in Rev. Rul. 65-299 that the credit counseling organization was not charitable. See Consumer Credit Counseling Serv., Inc. v. United
States, 78-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9660 (D.D.C. 1978). Compare Rev. Ru!. 67-294, 1967-2
C.B. 193 (social welfare status granted to organization that made business loans without regard
to the wealth of the businesses or the income of the owners to induce businesses to locate in an
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one form of the same general activity is charitable and another promotes social welfare, without explaining the basis for the distinction.
Hence, one nonprofit organization providing bus service to the community may be granted charitable status, while another may only be
accorded social welfare status. 15 Moreover, even when the Service
has described how it distinguishes two forms of a single general activity, it has not adequately explained why both forms are not charitable or how it determines appropriate treatment of dissimilar
activities. 16 This leaves one to speculate as to the Service's method
for implementing the distinction that it recognizes between charitable and social welfare organizations.
A hypothesis consistent with the revenue rulings is that the Service makes two determinations when classifying a group as either a
charitable organization or social welfare organization. The initial
question seems to involve whether or not the organization's activity
is conducted for private gain or benefit. To qualify for tax-exempt
status as either a charitable or social welfare organization, an organization's activity must not be conducted for private gain or benefit. 17
economically depressed area), with Rev. Ru!. 74-587, 197~2 C.B. 162 (charitable status
granted to similar organization that aided disadvantaged businesses).
Another way that the Service has distinguished similar activities as charitable or social
welfare is to look at what sectors of the public the activities are aimed at. Compare Rev. Ru!.
80-215, 1980-2 C.B. 174, with Rev. Ru!. 70-4, 1970-1 C.B. 126 (quoted at note 6supra). In Rev.
Ru!. 80-215, the Service declared that an organization formed to promote a sport throughout
the state for competitors under 18 years of age was charitable. The Service noted that the
organization combated juvenile delinquency and was educational. The Service explicitly distinguished Rev. Ru!. 70-4, a case involving a similar activity, because the organization in that
case "directed its activities to all members of the general public without regard to age. The
subject organization limits its activities to individuals under 18 years of age." 1980-2 C.B. at
174. The Service had denied charitable status to the organization in the 1970 ruling and classified it as a social welfare organization.
15. Compare Rev. Ru!. 78-68, 1978-1 C.B. 149, with Rev. Ru!. 78-69, 1978-1 C.B. 156. In
Rev. Ru!. 78-68, the Service declared charitable an organization providing bus service to isolated members of a co=unity not served by the existing bus system. In Rev. Ru!. 78-69, the
Service classified as social welfare an organization formed to provide bus service for a suburb
during rush hours to supplement existing but inadequate service. Each ruling cited the result
of the other ruling, but the Service did not explain the distinction that it made between the
services provided by the two organizations.
Compare Rev. Ru!. 78-131, 1978-1 C.B. 157 (organization promoting art through annual
art show granted social welfare status), with Rev. Ru!. 66-178, 1966-1 C.B. 138 (similar organization qualifies as charitable); Rev. Ru!. 69-384, 1969-2 C.B. 122 (amateur baseball association
is social welfare organization), with Hutchinson Baseball Enters. v. Co=issioner, 696 F.2d
757 (10th Cir. 1982) (baseball organization is charitable); Rev. Ru!. 67-109, 1967-1 C.B. 136
(organization providing a roller rink facility given social welfare status), with Rev. Ru!. 59-3 JO,
1959-2 C.B. 146 (organization operating a pool and other recreational facilities given charitable status).
16. Compare Rev. Ru!. 65-195, 1965-2 C.B. 164 (organization that promotes youth activities and other community benefit programs is social welfare organization), with Rev. Ru!. 76418, 1976-2 C.B. 145 (organization with purpose to reduce vehicle deaths by assisting local
governments is charitable), and Rev. Ru!. 67-291, 1967-2 C.B. 184 (organization that subsidizes a training table for coaches and members of a university's athletic teams is charitable).
17. Treas. Reg.§ l.501(c)(3)-J(d)(l)(ii) (1959) provides that an organization is not charitable "unless it serves a public rather than a private interest" and that the organization must

514

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 82:508

Once it has determined that an organization's activity is not conducted for private enrichment, the Service's second step appears to
be to categorize the organization as a charitable or social welfare
one. This determination requires an examination of the benefits to
the community that a particular organization generates. 18 The Service seemingly recognizes two levels of benefits: a minimum level
"establish that it is not organized or operated for the benefit of private interests." With respect
to social welfare organizations, Treas. Reg.§ l.501(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(ii) (1959) states in part:
Nor is any organization operated primarily for the promotion of social welfare if its primary activity is operating a social club for the benefit, pleasure, or recreation of its members, or is carrying on a business with the general public in a manner similar to
organizations which are operated for profit.
The court in Monterey Pub. Parking Corp. v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1970),
affd, 481 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1973), noted that "the Regulations aim at discovering whether
asserted civic or charitable ends are but subterfuges for what is fundamentally a private enterprise." 321 F. Supp. at 975. For more complete discussion of Monterey, see note 10 supra and
note 76 infra.
Accordingly, the Service has denied exempt status on the basis of private benefit, See, e.g.,
Rev. Rul. 80-107, 1980-1 C.B. 117 (shareholder organization to promote industry interests is
not social welfare organization); Rev. Rul. 78-132, 1978-1 C.B. 157 (community cooperative to
facilitate the exchange of personal services among members is not social welfare organization
because it operates for private benefit); Rev. Rul. 77-111, 1977-1 C.B. 144 (organization to
stimulate business to remedy economic declines is not charitable, because major benefits ac•
crue to the businesses); Rev. Rul. 74-553, 1974-2 C.B. 168 (medical association peer review
board is not charitable, since it serves professional interests). Compare Rev. Rul. 80-301, 19802 C.B. 181 (genealogical society with open membership is charitable), w11h Rev. Rul. 80-302,
1980-2 C.B. 182 (genealogical society with membership and activities limited to a single family
is not charitable).
In addition, the Service's non-acquiescence in one court decision was based on private
benefit grounds. The court in Eden Hall Farm v. United States, 389 F. Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa,
1975), upheld social welfare status for a working girls' vacation home. Use of the home was
available only to limited groups of women invited by the trustees of the Farm, and a corporation that had other close ties with the Farm employed most of the women who actually used
the home. The Service, in Rev. Rul. 80-205, 1980-2 C.B. 184, objected to the decision, stating:
"By restricting use of the facility to employees of selected corporations and their guests, the
organization is primarily benefiting a private group rather than primarily benefiting the com•
mon good and general welfare of the co=unity." 1980-2 C.B. at 185.
In one instance, however, the Service reached the wrong result using the private benefit
prohibition. In Rev. Rul. 75-286, 1975-2 C.B. 210, the Service denied charitable status to an
organization composed only of inhabitants of a city block and formed to beautify the block's
public areas. The organization's restricted membership and the limited scope of its activities
"indicate that the organization is . . . operated to serve the private interests of its members."
1975-2 C.B. at 210. The Service held that the organization did qualify for social welfare status,
however, even though operation for private interests should preclude social welfare status as
well.
For further discussion of the private benefit prohibition, see notes 68-73 infra and accom•
panying text.
18. The Service's regulations and rulings suggest, implicitly if not explicitly, that community benefit is a significant criterion in determining if an organization qualifies as charitable.
Treas. Reg.§ l.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (1959) defines "charitable" by referring to its "generally accepted legal sense," which would include "benefit to the community" whether one looks to tax
law or other laws. See notes 35-42 infra and accompanying text.
Regulations concerning the specific purposes deemed charitable under I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3)
(1982), see note 2 supra, illustrate the importance of community benefit when determining an
organization's charitable status. Treas. Reg. § l.501(c)(3)-l(d)(3)(i)(b) (1959) defines "educational," as used in subsection 501(c)(3), as relating in part to "[t)he instruction of the public on
subjects useful to the individual and beneficial to the community." Treas. Reg.§ l.501(c)(3)·
l(d)(5) (1959) requires that scientific organizations be "organized and operated in the public
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and a level beyond the minimum. Organizations that the Service
places in the social welfare category generate only the minimum
level of benefits, whereas organizations classified as charitable produce benefits beyond that minimum. 19 Thus, the Service presumably requires a charitable organization to justify its eligibility to
receive deductible contributions by showing that it delivers greater
benefits to the community.

B. Statutory Basis for the Service's Position
Two arguments support the distinction drawn by the Service between charitable and social welfare organizations. 2°First, such a distinction can be inferred from the fact that different subsections of
section 501 exempt charitable organizations and social welfare organizations from income taxation. 21 The Service originally took this
interest." Treas. Reg. § l.50l(c)(3)-l(d)(l)(ii) (1959), generally applicable to all subsection
50l(c)(3} organizations, also requires service to a public interest.
Likewise, to qualify as a social welfare organization, an organization must produce some
community benefit. Treas. Reg.§ l.50l(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(i) (1959) states: "An organization is operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare if it is primarily engaged in promoting in
some way the common good and general welfare of the people of the community."
See also Rev. Rul. 76-204, 1976-1 C.B. 152 (organization formed for environmental preservation purposes is charitable because its efforts serve a broad public purpose); Rev. Rul. 67325, 1967-2 C.B. l 13 (Service discusses the community benefit criterion as it relates to charitable organizations); Rev. Rul. 65-299, 1965-2 C.B. 165 (credit counseling organization is a social
welfare organization because it promotes the general welfare of the community); Rev. Rul. 65195, 1965-2 C.B. 164 (junior chamber of commerce is a social welfare organization because.it
promotes the common good and general welfare of the community).
19. It should be emphasized that no case, regulation, revenue ruling, or other source has
been found where the Service explicitly stated that its decision to deny charitable status to a
social welfare organization was due to the fact that the organization generated only a minimal
level of benefits. The Service's decisions in this area are conclusory, and do not offer specific
rationales for denying charitable status to certain social welfare organizations. However, as
demonstrated by the cases discussed in the notes below, the results that the Service reaches are
consistent with the hypothesis that the Service distinguishes between social welfare organizations and charitable organizations on the basis of the number of community benefits that each
produces.
For an example of an activity failing to qualify for charitable status because of insufficient community benefit, see Rev. Rul. 78-384, 1978-2 C.B. 174. In that ruling, the Service
denied charitable status to a nonprofit organization owning farmland that used the land only
for ecologically suitable uses. The Service noted that the land was not ecologically significant
and that the purpose, therefore, was not charitable. The public benefit was minimal because
the purpose was so limited. But see Rev. Rul. 76-204, 1976-1 C.B. 152 (organization formed to
acquire tracts of land for conservation purposes is charitable where the lands are either maintained and preserved or are turned over to a governmental conservation agency).
20. The Service has not expressly attempted to support its position: Thus, the Service has
never advanced the two arguments given here. However, these are the best arguments available in defense of the Service's position.
21. See I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3)-(4) (1982). The text of these provisions is set out at notes 2 & 3
supra.
In construing statutes, related provisions and the structure of the act should be considered.
See Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974); United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S.
600, 606 (1941). Courts attempt to avoid an interpretation of a statute that results in redundancy or fails to give effect to a section. See Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307-08
(1961); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955). Thus, the existence of differ-
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position while advocating a narrow reading of the term "charitable"
that limited the scope of that term to organizations that help the
poor.22 Even though the Service now favors a more expansive definition of the term "charitable,"23 it presumably still rests its distinction
between charitable and social welfare organizations on this separate
enumeration argument.
A second argument supporting the Service's position derives
from Congress' apparent recognition of the greater social desirability
of charitable activities as opposed to social welfare activities. Congress has made contributions to charitable organizations tax deductible.24 It is generally accepted that Congress intended section 170,25
the Code provision granting the deduction, to apply only to charitable organizations.26 Further, since subsection 170(c) specifically
ent subsections that exempt charitable and social welfare organizations implies that social welfare organizations were not intended to be subsumed under the category of charitable
organizations.
22. See I.T. 1800, 11-2 C.B. 152 (1923).
23. See note 46 infra and accompanying text.
24. See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (1982).
25. I.R.C. § 170(a) (1982) provides that charitable contributions can be deducted. I.R.C.
§ 170(c) (1982) defines what constitutes a "charitable contribution." This provision reads in
pertinent part:
(c) Charitable contribution defined.-For the purposes of this section, the term "charitable contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for the use of(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest fund, or foundation(A) created or organized in the United States or in any possession thereof, or
under the law of the United States, any State, the District of Columbia, or any possession
of the United States;
(B) organized and operated for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only
if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for
the prevention of cruelty to children or animals;
(C) no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual; and
(D) which is not disqualified for tax exemption under section 50l(c)(3) by reason
of attempting to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in
(including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf
of any candidate for public office.
A contribution or gift by a corporation to a trust, chest, fund, or foundation shall be
deductible by reason of this paragraph only ifit is to be used within the United States or
any of its possessions exclusively for purposes specified in subparagraph (B).
I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (1982).
26. The language of the deduction provision closely tracks that of the exemption provision
for charitable organizations. Compare I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (1982), supra note 25, with I.R.C.
§ 50l(c)(3) (1982), supra note 2. Because of the virtually identical language, the Supreme
Court has concluded that it "is apparent that Congress intended that list [of organizations) to
have the same meaning in both sections (170 and 50l(c)(3)]." Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2026 (1983). The Court also noted that both sections 170 and 50l(c)(3)
"seek to achieve the same basic goal of encouraging the development of certain organizations
through the grant of tax benefits. The language of the two sections is in most respects identical, and the Commissioner and the courts consistently have applied many of the same standards in interpreting those sections." 103 S. Ct. at 2026 n.10 (citations omitted). Finally, the
Court said that sections 501(c)(3) and 170 must be construed together. 103 S, Ct. at 2026 n.l I.
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makes contributions to other entities tax deductible, 27 Congress arguably meant to deny tax-deductible treatment for contributions to
other groups, such as social welfare organizations, not explicitly
mentioned. Congress made contributions to certain organizations
tax deductible because it recognized the benefits to the community
that such organizations generate.28 Because Congress has not explicitly made contributions to social welfare organizations tax deductible
as it has those to charitable organizations, the Service could assert
that the distinction it draws between these organizations is consistent
with a congressional preference for charitable organizations.
II.

SHORTCOMINGS OF THE SERVICE'S APPROACH

Two flaws exist in the Service's position that not all social welfare
organizations are entitled to recognition as charitable organizations
as well. First, the Service's statutory justification for denying any
social welfare organizations such recognition is untenable. Second,
the absence of any workable standard for determining whether or
not a social welfare organization qualifies as charitable produces arbitrary results that argue for elimination of the distinction.
A.

Untenability of the Statutory Basis for the Service's Position

An examination of the legislative history of subsections 50 I (c)(3)
and (4) reveals that the existence of separate provisions for charitable and social welfare organizations does not require that any social
welfare organizations be denied charitable status. 29 The exemption
for charitable organizations dates back to the Tariff Acts of 189430
and 1909.31 Although both tariff acts levied taxes only on corporations doing business for profit, 32 they also explicitly exempted reli27. Entities that may receive tax-deductible donations include states, cities, and veterans
organizations. See I.R.C. § 170(c) (1982).
28. See note 18 supra; note 92 infra .
. 29. I.R.C. § 50l(c)(4) (1982) exempts both politically active and non-political social welfare organizations. See note 4 supra. This Note argues that denial of charitable status to
politically active social welfare organizations is proper, see notes 84-87 infra and accompanying text, but that denial of charitable status to non-political social welfare organizations is not.
As stated previously, this Note uses "social welfare organization" to include only non-political
social welfare organizations unless otherwise indicated. See note 4 supra.
30. Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556. This act explicitly exempted from
income taxation "corporations, companies, or associations organized and conducted solely for
charitable, religious, or educational purposes," among other organizations. 28 Stat. at 556.
The income tax imposed by the 1894 act was declared unconstitutional in Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
31. Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 113. The pertinent language of this act
exempted "any corporation or association organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes, no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of
any private stockholder or individual." 36 Stat. at 113.
32. See Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556-57; Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38,
36 Stat. 11, 112-17.
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gious, charitable, and educational organizations. 33 Little direct
evidence exists as to whether or not Congress intended in these acts
to restrict "charitable" to its narrow meaning of "relief of the poor"34
or used it in the broad, common law sense of "purposes beneficial to
the community."35 However, the language of these statutes closely
tracks that used in a well-known 1891 British tax case which gave a
broad definition of "charity," 36 and the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress used the term "charitable" in its broad legal
sense of "purposes beneficial to the community."37 Thus, the legal
meaning of "charitable" contained in the 1894 and 1909 acts included the purpose for which social welfare organizations operate,
namely, "the promotion of social welfare."38
33. See notes 30-31 supra.
34. See, e.g., LT. 1800, 11-2 C.B. 152-53 (1923).
35. Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v. Pemsel, (1891] A.C. 531, 583;see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 368 comment a (1959). As to the paucity of legislative evidence bearing on this issue, see Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 8, at 301 ("[N]either
upon their initial enactment nor during the ensuing decades have these exemptions elicited
more than cursory legislative explanation, save for matters of technical detail."); Reiling, Federal Taxation: Whal ls a Charitable Organization?, 44 A.B.A. J. 525, 526 (1958).
36. Commissioners for Special Purposes oflncome Tax v. Pemsel, (1891] A.C. 531. In this
case before the House of Lords, Lord Macnaghten expressed himself as follows:
"Charity" in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the advancement of religion; and
trusts for other purposes beneficial to the co=unity, not falling under any of the preceding heads. The trusts last referred to are not the less charitable in the eye of the law,
because incidentally they benefit the rich as well as the poor . . . •
[1891] A.C. at 583. The co=on law of trusts also recognizes similar purposes as "charitable."
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 (1959).
37. In Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983), the Supreme Court quoted
the broad definition of "charity" given in Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax
v. Pemsel, (1891] A.C. 531, 583, see note 36 supra, noting that this case "has long been recog•
nized as a leading authority in this country." 103 S. Ct. at 2027. The Court stated that this and
other broad definitions of "charity" or "charitable" contained in still earlier Supreme Court
cases "clearly reveal the legal background against which Congress enacted the first charitable
exemption statute in 1894." 103 S. Ct. at 2027 (footnote omitted). The Court also observed
that the terms of the 1894 exemption "were in substance included" in the Tariff Act of 1909.
103 S. Ct. at 2027 n.i4. Thus, the Court acknowledged that the broad legal meaning of "charity," which includes "purposes beneficial to the co=unity," was used by Congress in the 1894
and 1909 acts.
In addition, Reiling states: "[F]or Congress to intend . . . that charity shall have its legal
meaning is not a new concept. In adopting terms known to the law of charities, it adopted a
pattern traditionally employed in the states." Reiling, supra note 35, at 526. Reiling also notes
that "if Congress used the term 'charitable' in its generally accepted legal sense - and there is
no evidence that it intended any other meaning- the use of the word . . . is alone sufficient to
bring the legal concept into operation." Id at 526. See also cases cited at note 45 i,!fra.
38. I.R.C. § 50l(c)(4) (1982). The law of trusts in the United States has always recognized
purposes beneficial to the co=unity or promoting the public or social welfare as charitable.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 368(£) (1935) ("Charitable purposes include . . . other
purposes the accomplishment of which is beneficial to the community . . . ."); RESTATEMENT
OF TRUSTS § 368 co=ent a (1935) ("The co=on element of all charitable purposes is that
they are designed to accomplish objects which are beneficial to the community."). The Re-,
statement treats "other purposes beneficial to the co=unity" as a residuary clause for charitable purposes: ''The present Section (374] deals with the large and indefinite classes of
purposes other than those which are dealt with in the preceding Sections which are neverthe-
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In the Tariff Act of 1913, Congress added a new tax exemption
specifically for social welfare organizations.39 The particular reason
for the inclusion of this exemption in the 1913 act is unclear. 40 Howless held to promote the social interests of the co=unity and are upheld as falling within the
scope of charitable purposes." RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 374 co=ent a (1935). The more
recent Restatement adopts an identical position. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§§ 368, 374 (1959); see also 4 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 368, at 2853 (3d ed. 1967)
("[T]here must be added a more general and indefinite category, a general catchall, to include
the vast number of miscellaneous purposes which are properly held to be charitable. Perhaps
these can best be included under the heading of other purposes the accomplishment of which is
beneficial to the co=unity."); id § 374.
39. Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(G)(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172. The last clause of the general
exemption provision exempts "any civic league or organization not organized for profit, but
operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare." 38 Stat. at 172.
40. If"charitable" in the 1913 act was to be construed in the same broad sense that it was
used in the 1909 act, then a separate exemption provision for social welfare organizations
would seem unnecessary: the charitable exemption would already have included such organizations. This raises the argument that the addition of the social welfare organization exemption in the 1913 act was meant to restrict "charitable" to its narrow definition of "relief of the
poor." See note 34supra and accompanying text. However, no evidence exists to support this
argument. See notes 52-54 infra and accompanying text.
The role of the social welfare exemption puzzled one member of the 1921 Senate. Prior to
1939, revenue acts were normally passed every other year, often carrying over verbatim language from the previous act. See w. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 12 (2d
ed. 1979). During debate over the Revenue Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 227, Senator Wadsworth
questioned the language of the social welfare exemption, which was unchanged from the Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1057. He noted that" 'civic leagues or organizations' . . . is a rather
vague term." 61 CONG. REC. 5824 (1921). Further, he observed that" 'social welfare' . . . is
equally vague and there will always be a good deal of dispute as to what 'social welfare' may
be." Id at 5824. Senator Wadsworth then suggested that "social welfare" be stricken from the
provision. Id at 5825. In response to this suggestion, two senators pointed out that the provision had merely been carried over. One stated: "It is the same as the old law, which has been
in force for a number of years." Id at 5825 (statement of Sen. McCumber). The other senator
added: "As I understand it, it has been administered by the department without any trouble."
Id at 5825 (statement of Sen. Walsh). In response, Senator Wadsworth said: "Then I withdraw my proposed amendment, but I am still hungry for a definition of 'social welfare.'" Id
at 5825.
Initially, the social welfare provision was virtually ignored by the Service. The first regulation that cited the social welfare provision offered only an example of an organization that was
not within its scope because it was organized for profit. See Treas. Reg. 62, art. 519 (1922),
reprinted in I I INTERNAL REVENUE REGULATIONS 174 (Carlton Fox Collection of the University of Michigan Law Library). A 1919 regulation had seemed to recognize that the promotion
of social welfare came within the scope of charitable purposes when it cited as an example of a
charitable organization an association "aiding the general body of litigants by improving the
efficient administration of justice.'' Treas. Reg. 62, art. 517 (1922), reprinted in 11 INTERNAL
REVENUE REGULATIONS 172, 173 (Carlton Fox Collection of the University of Michigan Law
Library); see also S-992, 1 C.B. 145 (1919) ("The word 'charitable' has a broad significance.");
A.R.R. 477, 4 C.B. 264,265 (1921) (appeals co=ittee notes with approval a solicitor's opinion
citing the legal definition of "charitable" as being "a gift, act, or service for the benefit of an
indefinite number of persons"). Nonetheless, in a 1923 ruling the Service first asserted that the
social welfare provision limited the scope of "charitable" to its popular sense, which excluded
the promotion of social welfare. See I.T. 1800, II-2 C.B. 152 (1923); note 43 infra.
The Service subsequently amended the regulations to reflect this narrower interpretation of
"charitable." Article 517 was amended to read as follows: "Corporations organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes comprise, in general, organizations for the relief of the
poor.'' Treas. Reg. 65, art. 517, T.D. 3735, IV-2 C.B. 76, 77 (1925), reprinted in 11 INTERNAL
REVENUE REGULATIONS 152, 152 (Carlton Fox Collection of the University of Michigan Law
Library). The regulations defined the social welfare provision broadly: "Civic leagues . . .

520

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 82:508

ever, no clear evidence suggests that Congress intended to restrict the
broad meaning of "charitable" so as to exclude social welfare organizations from the category of charitable organizations established
by the Tariff Acts of 1894 and 1909.41
It is now generally accepted that the broad, common law notion
of charity, which includes the promotion of social welfare,42 expresses the original and continuing meaning of "charitable" under
tax law. The Service asserted in 1923 that "charitable" was to be
construed in its narrow, popular sense,43 and thus required that orgacomprise those not organized for profit but operated exclusively for purposes beneficial to the
community as a whole. In general, organizations engaged in promoting the welfare of mankind, other than organizations comprehended within [the charitable exemption], are included
...•" Treas. Reg. 65, art. 519 (1924), reprinted in 11 INTERNAL REVENUE REGULATIONS 153
(Carlton Fox Collection of the University of Michigan Law Library).
Commentators did not view the addition of the social welfare exemption as narrowing the
definition of "charitable." Black construed the charitable exemption broadly in 1919, see note
41 inji-a, as he had in 1913 after the original passage of the social welfare exemption. See H.
BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INCOME TAXATION§ 81 (1st ed. 1913). Moreover, he
could offer no insight on the meaning of the social welfare exemption. See H. BLACK, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INCOME TAXATION § 127 (4th ed. 1919) [hereinafter cited as H.
BLACK, 1919 TREATISE]. Another author suggested that "charitable" should be interpreted
broadly,see R. FOSTER, A TREATISE ON THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX UNDER THE ACT OF 1913
§ 41, at 171-72 (2d ed. 1915), and did nothing more than quote the social welfare exemption in
his treatise. Id § 41, at 164.
41. No legislative history suggests that the use of "charitable" in 1913 was intended to be
different from its 1909 usage, which included within its purview the purposes of social welfare
organizations. See notes 37-38 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, the language of the
1913 exemption for charitable organizations was identical to that of the 1909 provision with
the exception of the addition of the term "scientific" to the listing of specific exempt purposes,
Compare Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(G)(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172, with Tariff Act of 1909, ch, 6,
§ 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112.
At least one scholar writing after passage of the 1913 act expressed the view that "charitable" was to be broadly construed:
The rules with reference to the exemption of such associations from the burdens of ordinary taxation have been well worked out by the courts, and will generally be found applicable in the case of the special tax here under consideration . . . . [l]t is a general rule, in
the construction of exemptions from taxation that the word "charity" is not to be re•
stricted to the relief of the sick or poor, but extends to any form of philanthropic endeavor
or public beneficence.
H. BLACK, 1919 TREATISE, supra note 40, § 123 (footnotes 01nitted).
42. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
43. This position was set out in a 1923 ruling:
It will be seen that "charitable" in [its] broad sense includes, among other things, education, religion, relief of the poor, social service, and civic or public benefactions. On the
other hand, "charitable" in its popular and ordinary sense pertains to the relief of the
poor.•..
In section 231(6) of the Revenue Act of 1918 and 1921 the organizations enumerated
are religious, charitable, scientific, literary, and educational, while in section 231(8) Con•
gress specifically mentions civic leagues and organizations operated exclusively for the
promotion of social welfare. It seems obvious that the intent must have been to use the
word "charitable" in section 231(6) in its more restricted and common meaning and not to
include either religious, scientific, literary, educational, civic, or social welfare organizations. Otherwise, the word "charitable" would have been used by itself as an all-inclusive
term ..•.
Considering subdivisions (6) and (8) of section 231 together, it is seen that a distinction
is made between religious, charitable (in its ordinary sense), scientific, literary, and educa-
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nizations provide relief for the poor to be considered charitable.44
Over the years courts resisted this restrictive interpretation,45 however, and the Service finally acquiesced in 1959 by changing its regulations to recognize the broader meaning of "charitable."46 In doing
so, the Service brought its interpretation back into line with that intional organizations, on the one hand, and civic and social welfare organizations on the
other hand.
I.T. 1800, 11-2 C.B. 152, 153 (1923).
44. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. 65, art. 517, T.D. 3735, IV-2 C.B. 76 (1925),reprintedin 11 INTERNAL REVENUE REGULATIONS 152 (Carlton Fox Collection of the University of Michigan Law
Library); Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.lOl(c)-l(b) (1953).
45. See Arthur Jordan Found. v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 885, 888 (7th Cir. 1954) (citing
and applying broad definition of "charitable," noting that "the use of funds for social advancement ... would tend 'to promote the well doing and well being of social man'") (quoting
Ould v. Washington Hosp. for Foundlings, 95 U.S. 303,311 (1877)); St. Louis Union Trust Co.
v. Barnet, 59 F.2d 922, 926 (8th Cir. 1932) (citing and applying broad "definition of a legal
charity"); Bok v. McCaughn, 42 F.2d 616, 618-19 (3d Cir. 1930) (pointing to several broad
definitions of "charitable"); United States v. Proprietors of Social Law Library, 102 F.2d 481,
483 (1st Cir. 1929) (looking at legal meaning of charitable); Koehler v. Lewellyn, 44 F.2d 654,
655-56 (W.D. Pa. 1930) (applying legal definition of charity) ("We do not believe that we have
the power to read into the act of Congress the restriction [requirement of relief of the poor]
which the ... [Service] asks us to."); DeForest v. Commissioner, 19 B.T.A. 595, 599 (1930)
(aid to needy is not exclusive meaning of "charity"); Turnure v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 871
(1927) (arguing that broad definition of charitable allows contributions to social welfare organization to be deductible);seea/so Slee v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1930); Peters
v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 55, 59 (1953) (discussed at note 10 supra).
More recent cases show that courts continue to accept the broad scope of "charitable." See,
e.g., National Right to Work Legal Defense & Educ. Found. v. United States, 487 F. Supp.
801,807 (E.D.N.C. 1979) (organization providing legal aid to workers suffering discrimination
through compulsory union arrangements held charitable) ("[T]he threshold question is
whether the taxpayer renders community benefit."); Virginia Professional Standards Review
Found. v. Blumenthal, 466 F. Supp. 1164, 1170 (D.D.C. 1979) (professional self-regulation
function served the public and therefore did not preclude charitable status); Northern Cal.
Cent. Serv. v. United States, 591 F.2d 620, 626 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (hospital services organization
was charitable under public benefit test); Consumer Credit Counseling Serv., Inc. v. United
States, 78-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9660 (D.D.C. 1979) (credit counseling service was charitable even though it served the public, not just the impoverished).
46. Treas. Reg.§ l.50l(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (1959) defines "charitable" in its "generally accepted
legal sense." The current regulation relating to I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) (1982) was promulgated in
1959 and made applicable to tax years beginning after July 26, 1959. See T.D. 6391, 1959-2
C.B. 140; Treas. Reg.§ l.50l(c)(3)-l(f) (1959).
Although the Service's reasons for abandoning its narrow view of charity in 1959 are not
clear, a 1958 article written by the Assistant Chief Counsel to the Internal Revenue Service is
revealing. The author points to the use of charity in its legal sense and quotes from a British
tax case which notes that trusts for purposes beneficial to the community "are not the less
charitable . . . because incidentally they benefit the rich as well as the poor, as indeed every
charity must do either directly or indirectly." Reiling, supra note 35, at 527 (footnote omitted).
Reiling rejected the narrow view - the view of the regulations at the time of his writing - as
impracticable. Id at 527.
While the Service now interprets "charitable" in its broad legal sense, it has not explicitly
applied the legal concept of charity to social welfare organizations. Rather, the Service has
treated "charitable" and "social welfare" as distinct concepts. See, e.g., Rev. Ru!. 75-384,
1975-2 C.B. 204 (war protest organization was not charitable under the law of trusts and did
not provide social welfare, since its purpose was contrary to the common good and general
welfare); Rev. Ru!. 74-361, 1974-2 C.B. 159 (volunteer fire department was charitable under
the law of trusts and also qualified as a social welfare organization because it promoted the
common good and general welfare); see also Monterey Pub. Parking Corp. v. United States,
321 F. Supp. 972, 975 (N.D. Cal. 1970), affd, 481 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1973) (Service cited trust
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tended by Congress in the Tariff Act of 1913 and its predecessor
statutes.47
Since the term "charitable" as used in the 1913 act was intended
to be construed in its broad sense, modem social welfare organizations48 should also fall within the category of charitable organizations. The purpose of social welfare organizations, namely, the
"promotion of social welfare," 49 was "charitable" under the 1913
act. 5°Current section 50l(c)(3) retains the same meaning of "charitable" used in the 1913 act.51 Therefore, a group that qualifies as a
law private benefit prohibition as basis for denying charitable status; cited operation as a business as basis for denying social welfare status).
Proposed regulations published earlier than those adopted in 1959 would have gone further
in recognizing the broad sense of "charitable." They stated that the definition of that term
"includes ... promotion of social welfare" without listing specific social welfare purposes that
qualify. (Current regulations make such a listing. See note 5supra.) Treas. Reg.§ l.50l(c)(3)l(d)(2), 24 Fed. Reg. 1421, 1423 (1959) (proposed February 26, 1959). If the Service had
adopted these regulations, it would have essentially taken the same position that this Note
advocates. Why the final regulations changed the proposals to include a list of qualifying
social welfare purposes is not clear.
47. See notes 29-41 supra and accompanying text. The Service's earlier construction of
"charitable" had received some attention from Congress in 1924. Senator Willis noted the
Service's narrow interpretation of the charitable deduction provision and proposed an amendment to override the Co=issioner's determination by defining "charitable" to include certain
forms of "preventive and constructive service." See 65 CONG. REC. 8171 (1924). Other senators objected on the grounds that Senator Willis' suggestion was vague and overly broad. See
id. at 8172 (statements of Sens. Smoot and Walsh). Neither the narrow nor the broad definitions of "charitable" were discussed, however, and Senator Willis eventually withdrew his
amendment. See id. at 8173.
In 1932, Rep. Wolcott expressed a similar concern that "charitable" was vulnerable to narrow interpretation, and proposed to add the term "character-building" to the deduction provision. See 75 CONG. REC. 6487 (1932) (statement of Rep. Wolcott). Another congressman
objected that such an amendment would "delimit the construction of the word 'charitable.' "
Id. at 6488 (statement of Rep. Stafford) (emphasis added). Rep. Wolcott was subsequently
satisfied that the provil.ion was construed broadly enough to relieve his concern, and his
amendment was rejected. See id. at 6488.
48. Treas. Reg. § l.50l(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(i) (1959) states: "An organization is operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare if it is primarily engaged in promoting in some way
the co=on good and general welfare of the people of the community." The first regulations
defining social welfare organizations similarly stated: "Civic leagues ... comprise those not
organized for profit but operated exclusively for purposes beneficial to the community as a
whole. In general, organizations engaged in promoting the welfare of mankind, other than
organizations comprehended within . . . [the charitable exemption,] are included ...•"
Treas. Reg. 65, art. 519 (1924),reprintedin 11 INTERNAL REVENUE REGULATIONS 153 (Carlton
Fox Collection of the University of Michigan Law Library).
Courts generally agree with this characterization of the social welfare exemption. See People's Educ. Camp Socy. v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1964). Moreover, the legislative history does not suggest any other intended meaning. See note 40 supra.
49. I.R.C. § 50l(c)(4) (1982); see also note 48 supra.
50. See notes 29-41 supra and accompanying text.
51. The language of I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) (1982) does not reveal a congressional intent to
narrow the meaning of"charitable." While subsection 50l(c)(3) lists several purposes in addition to a charitable purpose that qualify an organization for tax-exempt status, this does not
mean that these additional purposes fall outside the meaning of "charitable." Rather, all the
purposes listed in subsection 50l(c)(3) are charitable. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
103 S. Ct. 2017, 2026 (1983). Moreover, although the term "charitable" includes the specified
purposes, it is not limited to them. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 368 comment b

December 1983]

Note -

Social We(fare Organizations

523

social welfare organization under present law should qualify as a
charitable organization as well.
Yet the argument remains that Congress must have had some
purpose in creating a separate class of social welfare organizations,
and that this purpose may have been to exclude them from the charitable organization classification.52 However, no clear evidence in the
legislative history of section 501 indicates a congressional intent to
exclude social welfare organizations from the charitable classification.53 On the contrary, as detailed above, ample evidence suggests
(1959). Treas. Reg.§ l.50l(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (1959) includes purposes other than relief of poverty
in its definition of charitable. See note 5 supra. Likewise, the courts have recognized that
"charitable" as used in subsection 50l(c)(3) is not limited to relief of the poor. See Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147, 150-51 (4th Cir. 1980), qffd, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983); see
also Reiling, supra note 35, at 527-28.
·
52. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
53. The legislative history of the social welfare exemption is inconclusive on the meaning
of the term. See notes 39-41 supra and accompanying text. Some, however, have gleaned
what they regard as the impetus for the exemption from portions of 1913 Senate hearings on
the legislation that introduced the social welfare provision. See People's Educ. Camp Socy. v.
Commissioner, 331 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1964); McGovern, The Exemption Provisions of Subchapter F, 29 A.B.A. TAX LAW. 523, 530 (1976). In the hearings, the United States Chamber of
Commerce requested a specific exemption of "civic and commercial organizations." Briefs and
Statements: Hearings on Tar!ff Schedules of the Revenue Act of 1913 (H.R 3321) Before the
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. 2001 (statement ofE. Goodwin, General Secretary, Chamber of Commerce of the United States) [hereinafter cited as
Briefs and Statements]. This statement noted that the then-proposed 1913 tariff made no specific exemption of civic and commercial organizations. Such an exemption would have been
unnecessary previously, because the 1909 tariff had taxed only corporations organized for
profit. The statement also noted the Chamber's belief that the charitable exemption did not
cover civic and commercial organizations. In addition, the American Warehousemen's Association requested a provision similar to the Chamber's. See Briefs and Statements, supra, at
2040.
These beliefs as to the scope of "charitable," based perhaps on the interpretation of "charitable" in its popular sense, imply that the Chamber of Commerce and the American Warehousemen's Association did not consider social welfare organizations ("civic organizations")
charitable. One could thus argue that in adopting the social welfare exemption, Congress accepted the narrow meaning of charitable held by these groups. The Senate Finance Committee passed the following 1913 amendment to the provision:
[The corporate income tax shall not apply (l)] to business leagues, nor to chambers of
commerce or boards of trade, not organized for profit or no part of the net income of
which inures to the benefit of the private stockholder or individual; nor [(2)] to any civic
league or organization not organized for profit, but operated exclusively for the promotion
of social welfare . . . .
J. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS: 1938-1861,
at 1002 (1938). The Supreme Court has recognized these groups' statements as the impetus for
the 1913 exemption of business leagues, which originated in the Senate Finance Committee
and appears above as the first clause of the committee's amendment. See National Muffler
Dealers Assn. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 478-79 (1979). Thus, that the Chamber of Commerce and the American Warehousemen's Association had referred to "civic" and "business"
organizations is significant considering the language of the Committee's amendment.
Nonetheless, the possibility that these groups spurred the addition of the social welfare
exemption does not necessarily mean that Congress adopted a narrow view of "charity," because the statements of the groups did not clearly adopt that narrow view. It is more likely
that the groups were referring to charity in its broad legal sense. Their statements focused on
the "commercial advancement," "trade and commerce," and business "membership" attributes of business organizations. See Briefs and Statements, supra, at 2002. These statements
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that Congress meant to include groups whose aim is the "promotion
of social welfare" within the category of tax-exempt charitable
organizations.54
Furthermore, given that Congress intended all along that social
welfare organizations be included within the class of charitable organizations, no need exists for a separate provision to make contributions to social welfare organizations tax deductible because such
contributions should be deductible under the provision pertaining to
charitable organizations.55 Hence, the absence of a specific provision
granting a tax deduction for contributions to social welfare organizations does not imply that Congress sought to distinguish these organizations from charitable ones or felt them less beneficial to the
public.56 They are charitable organizations.
displayed a concern for an exemption for business organizations, understandable given the
business nature of both the Chamber of Commerce and the American Warehousemen's Asso•
ciation. The business groups were correct in their view that these organizations were not chari•
table and thus did not qualify under the already-existing charitable exemption; business
leagues and chambers of commerce generally are not charitable in the law of trusts because
they operate for the benefit of their members. See 4 A. Scorr, supra note 38, § 375.2, at 295758 (3d ed. 1961);seealso Rev. Ru!. 78-132, 1978-1 C.B. 157; Rev. Ru!. 74-553, 1974-2 C.B. 168.
However, the groups were incorrect in assuming that social welfare organizations ("civic organizations") were also not charitable for the same reason. Although no organization operating
for private benefit may be charitable, see notes 68-77 infra and accompanying text, social welfare organizations must operate for public, as opposed to private, benefit. See note 17 supra.
Thus, the statements by the Chamber of Commerce and the American Warehousemen's Association could have confused Congress by incorrectly associating civic organizations, operated
for public benefit, with business organizations, operated for private benefit. This would ex•
plain the existence of a separate exemption provision for social welfare organizations, despite
their charitable nature. In any event, no clear statement that Congress meant to exclude social
welfare organizations from the category of charitable organizations can be gleaned from the
legislative record.
54. See notes 29-51 supra and accompanying text.
55. See I.R.C. § 170 (1982); see also note 34 supra.
56. An examination of earlier legislation that granted charitable deductions does not reveal
a congressional intent to exclude social welfare organizations from receiving this benefit. The
War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330, enabled individuals to deduct
contributions to charitable organizations as a war measure. The language of the provision
closely paralleled that of the charitable exemption, which this Note argues included social
welfare organizations, see notes 29-41 supra and accompanying text, and it was construed
accordingly. See Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 251, T.D. 3146 (1920 ed.), reprinted in 8 INTERNAL REV·
ENUE REGULATIONS 100 (Carlton Fox Collection !Jf the University of Michigan Law Library).
Corporations became eligible for charitable deductions in 1935. See Revenue Act of 1935, Ch.
29, § l02(c), 49 Stal 1014, 1016. No explicit reference to social welfare organizations accom•
panied either the War Revenue Act of 1917 or the Revenue Act of 1935. Thus, Congress did
not attempt explicitly to exclude them from the group of charitable organizations benefited by
these later acts.
Moreover, the argument that Congress implicitly denied eligibility for deductible contribu•
lions to social welfare organizations in the 1917 and 1935 acts is not supportable. The social
welfare exemption had no defined meaning when the 1917 act was passed. See notes 39-41
supra and accompanying text. Given this, Congress could not have implicitly denied social
welfare organizations the benefit of the 1917 act because what type of organizations were social
welfare ones was not clear at the time. Further, Congress merely used the language in the
individual deduction provision in adopting the corporate deduction provision contained in the
1935 act. In doing so, it does not appear that Congress intended that this new provision be
interpreted under the Service's then-existing regulations, which included a narrow interprela•
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B. The Arbitrary Results Produced by the Service's .Distinction
As noted earlier, the Service apparently distinguishes between
charitable organizations and social welfare organizations based on
the number of community benefits that each type of organization
generates. 57 Such a distinction leads to arbitrary results for two reasons. First, Congress has not set out any guidelines for distinguishing the two organizations 58 and no characteristics of the
organizations themselves suggest a workable basis for such a distinction. 59 Second, attempts to quantify community benefits are doomed
to fail because such benefits are inherently unquantifiable. 60
tion of "charitable." See notes 43-44 supra. The position of many courts on the meaning of
"charitable" in 1935 was opposed to that of the Service. See note 45 supra. It is not possible to
determine which of the two views, if either, Congress implicitly adopted in the 1935 act.
In short, the issue whether or not a distinction exists between charitable and social welfare
organizations arises only because of the existence of separate exemption provisions for each
type oforganization in the Code. See I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3)-(4) (1982). No other plausible reason
can be found in the legislative history of the exemption and deduction provisions pertaining to
these two types of organizations to exclude social welfare organizations from the general category of charitable organizations. See notes 52-54 supra and accompanying text.
51. See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text.
58. Congress has not expressed any judgment on the degree, if any, to which charitable
activities are more beneficial than social welfare activities. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)-(4) (1982);
notes 29-51 supra and accompanying text. The argument made by this Note, of course, is that
social welfare activities are a form of charitable activities.
59. One commentator states: "[T]he specific criteria to be utilized in distinguishing . . . [a]
social welfare organization from . . . [a] charitable organization that promotes social welfare
are unclear." 2 s. WEITHORN, TAX TECHNIQUES FOR FOUNDATIONS AND OTHER EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS§ 5.06, at5-129 (1980). See also Treas. Reg.§§ l.50l(c)(3)-l(d)(2); l.50(c)(4)l(a)(2)(i) (1959) ("charitable" and "social welfare" defined by reference to one another); Rev.
Ru!. 74-361, 1974-2 C.B. 159 (same organization may simultaneously qualify under both
I.R.C. 50l(c)(3) and 50l(c)(4) (1982)); B. HOPKINS, supra note I, at 255-56 ("[T]he concepts of
what is 'charitable' and what constitutes 'social welfare' can be very much alike."); Bittker &
Rahdert, supra note 8, at 346-48; Chester, The Charitable Foundation in Wisconsin, 43 MARQ.
L. REV. 301, 305 (1960).
60. In Treas. Reg.§ l.50l(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (1959), quoted at note 5 supra, the Service set out a
list of categories that constitute charitable purposes. If an activity falls into one of these categories, it presumably generates the greater number of benefits that the Service apparently requires for charitable organizations. See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text. Such a
quantification approach to distinguishing between charitable and social welfare organizations,
however, is made impracticable by the amorphous character of charitable purposes:
A purpose is charitable if its accomplishment is of such social interest to the community as
to justify permitting the property to be devoted to the purpose in perpetuity. There is no
fixed standard to determine what purposes are of such social interest to the community;
the interests of the community vary with time and place.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368, comment b (1959). Given that "no fixed standard" exists whereby to determine that a purpose rises to the level of charitable, attempts by
the Service to distinguish between charitable and social welfare organizations based on the
amount of community benefits generated by each inevitably lead to arbitrary and unpredictable results.
In apparent recognition of the difficulty of arriving at a precise definition of charitable
purposes, Treas. Reg. § l.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (1959) states that the list of charitable purposes it
contains is not exclusive. See note 5 supra; cf. Rev. Ru!. 80-200, 1980-2 C.B. 173 (charitable
includes care of orphans); Rev. Ru!. 76-204, 1976-1 C.B. 152 (preservation of the environment
is charitable).
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The Service's treatment of specific charitable organizations under
subsection 50l{c)(3) contrasts with the quantification approach presumably used to distinguish social welfare organizations under subsection 50l{c)(4). When deciding whether or not an organization
promotes a purpose explicitly recognized as "charitable" under subsection 50l(c)(3),61 such as education62 or the prevention of cruelty
to children,63 the Service does not try to quantify the benefit to the
community. Instead, it simply examines the characteristics and functions of the organization to make this determination. How much
knowledge the organization's activities convey or how many children
they protect is irrelevant. 64 Attempts to quantify such benefits would
be administratively unfeasible.
Indeed, the Service's apparent attempts to quantify such benefits
in determining whether or not a social welfare organization qualifies
as charitable illustrate the weakness of such an approach. As outlined earlier, no consistent pattern appears in the Service's decisions.65 This state of affairs leaves one to speculate as to the criteria
that the Service uses, makes the Service's decisions appear arbitrary,
and does not give the predictability that the tax law should provide.
Ill. A SUPERIOR APPROACH: RECOGNIZING SOCIAL WELFARE
ORGANIZATIONS AS CHARITABLE UNDER§ 50l(c)(3)
A. A Proposed Method of Classification

The Service and courts should abandon any attempt to distinguish social welfare organizations from charitable organizations by
quantifying the community benefits produced by each type of organization.66 Rather, they should recognize social welfare organizations
as charitable under subsection 50l(c)(3), which would make such organizations eligible to receive deductible contributions. 67 To achieve
61. I.R.C. § 50l(c}(3) (1982) explicitly recognizes the following purposes as charitable:
religious; scientific; testing for public safety; literary; educational; national or international
amateur sports competition; prevention of cruelty to children or animals. See note 2 supra.
62. See I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) (1982); see also Rev. Rul. 67-291, 1967-2 C.B. 184 (organization
that subsidized a training table for coaches and athletes of a university's athletic teams is charitable under § 50l(c)(3) because it thereby furthers the school's educational program); Rev.
Rul. 66-178, 1966-1 C.B. 138 (organization sponsoring an art exhibit falls within subsection
50l(c)(3) as a charitable or educational organization).
63. See I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) (l982);seea!so Rev. Rul. 67-151, 1967-1 C.B. 134 (organization
to protect working children comes within subsection 50l(c)(3)).
64. Even if an organization operates for one of the charitable purposes specified in I.R.C.
§ 50l(c)(3) (1982), see note 61 supra, to qualify as charitable it must not be conducted for
private gain. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
65. See notes 13-16 supra and accompanying text.
66. See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text.
67. That is, except for "political" social welfare organizations, or "action organizations,"
which would not qualify for charitable status. See note 4 supra; notes 84-87 i,!fra and accompanying text.
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recognition as a social welfare and thus charitable organization
under the approach this Note suggests, however, an organization (1)
must not operate for private gain, and (2) must benefit the community in some way.
The prohibition on operation for private gain68 has been. consistently enforced by the Service69 and courts. 70 One commentator has
68. See Treas. Reg. § l.50l(c)(3)-l{d)(l){ii) (1959). This regulation provides that an organization is not charitable "unless it serves a public rather than a private interest" and that
the organization must "establish that it is not organized or operated for the benefit of private
interests." Treas. Reg.§ l.501(c)(3)-l(d)(l)(ii) (1959); see also note 17 supra and accompanying text. The private-gain prohibition is also clearly established in the law of charitable trusts,
see RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 376 (1959); 4 A. SCOTT, supra note 38, § 376, which
is often applied in tax cases. See, e.g., Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1158 (D.D.C.
1971), qjfd. sub nom., Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971); Northern Cal. Cent. Serv. v. United
States, 591 F.2d 620, 626 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Rev. Rul. 76-204, 1976-1 C.B. 152; Rev. Rul. 67-325,
1967-2 C.B. 113. Reference to trust Jaw to construe "charitable" is proper where this term is
used in its legal sense. See notes 35-38 supra and accompanying text.
A distinction must be drawn between the prohibition on private gain, which applies only to
charitable organizations, and the restriction on "private inurement," which applies to charitable organizations as well as several other tax-exempt organizations. Subsection 50J(c)(3) explicitly denies charitable status if"[any] part of the net earnings of [the organization] inures to
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual." I.R.C. § 50J(c)(3) (1982). This privateinurement restriction is co=on to several other exemption clauses. See I.R.C. § 50l(c)(6)(7), (9), (11), (13), (19) (1982). Hopkins explains the private-inurement restriction as follows:
It appears relatively clear that the statutory concept of private inurement, with its emphasis on inurement of "net earnings," contemplates a type of transaction between the
exempt organization and an individual in the nature of an "insider," the latter able to
cause the application of the organization's net earnings for private purposes as the result
of his exercise of control or influence.
[T)he Service has made it clear that proscribed private inurement involves a transaction or series of transactions, such as unreasonable compensation, unreasonable rental
charges, or deferred or retained interests in the organization's assets.
B. HOPKINS, supra note I, at 159 (footnote omitted). See generally id. at 158-76.
While the focus of the private-inurement restriction is thus transactional, that of the private-gain prohibition is more general: it focuses on whether or not the motive for conducting
the activity in question is to serve the private interests of the organizers. See id. at 49. An
activity is conducted for private interests when its benefits - monetary or otherwise - are
intended to accrue primarily to the organizers rather than the public-at-large. See 4 A. SCOTT,
supra note 38, § 376, at 2971-72.
The differing aims of the private-inurement restriction and the private-gain prohibition are
significant with respect to organizations exempted under a provision other than subsection
50l(c)(3). For example, although business leagues and chambers of commerce will be denied
exemption under subsection 50l(c)(6) when private inurement exists, see I.R.C. § 50l(c)(6)
(1982), organization for private gain does not generally preclude exemption under this provision. See Rev. Rul. 74-553, 1974-2 C.B. 168; Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 8, at 302 ("[O]ther
exempt organizations (such as chambers of co=erce, consumer cooperative societies, and
labor unions) are operated primarily for the economic benefit of their members."). But see
National Muffler Dealers Assn. v. United States. 440 U.S. 472 (1978) (muffler dealers association not exempt as a business league because it served dealers of only one manufacturer in an
industry). However, because such organizations do operate for the private gain of their members, they are not eligible for charitable status. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-553, 1974-2 C.B. 168
(medical peer review board exempt under§ 50l(c)(6) but not under§ 50l(c)(3)); see also 4 A.
SCOTT, supra note 38, § 375.2, at 2957-61.
·
69. See notes 17 & 68 supra.
70. See, e.g., Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924); Industrial Addition Assn. v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1945); Virginia Professional Standards Review Found. v. Blumenthal, 466 F. Supp. 1164, 1173 (D.D.C. 1979) (benefits to
participants in organization for self-regulation are incidental to broad charitable purpose and,
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succinctly summarized this prohibition as follows: "If an undertaking is conducted for private profit, it is not charitable. This is true
although the purposes are such that, if it were not conducted for private profit, it would be charitable." 71 The rationale for the privategain prohibition follows from the tax policies underlying deductibility of contributions and tax-exempt status. The right to receive deductible contributions and the grant of tax-exempt status provide
incentives for organizations to engage in beneficial activities for
which insufficient market incentives exist. 72 Where the private gain
from an activity is great enough, such additional incentives provided
by the tax law are not necessary to induce people to engage in it.
Private entities will still conduct the activity for private gain, and the
activity will still generate community benefits without public subsidization through the tax law.73
Nonetheless, some benefit to persons who operate a charitable
organization is inevitable, since, as members of the community, they
will enjoy the community benefits produced by the organization's
activities along with everyone else.74 However, the private-gain prohibition is still administratively feasible. The fact-finder need not
delve into the minds of the organizers to determine whether these
persons are acting philanthropically or selfishly.75 Instead, the
therefore, do not preclude charitable status); Monterey Pub. Parking Corp. v. United States,
321 F. Supp. 972,976 (N.D. Cal. 1970) ("This court cannot say that plaintiff corporation .. ,
subserves in any substantial way, private interests."), ajfd., 481 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1973); Kentucky Bar Found. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 921 (1982) (benefits accruing to legal profession
through activities of bar association foundation incidental to broad charitable purpose);
Dumaine Farms v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 650, 670-71 (1980) (benefits to settlor of scientific
and educational trust same as those to the general public); Sound Health Assn. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 158, 181-85 (1978) (private interests were not served in substantial degree, because eligibility for membership in organization was practically unlimited); Christian
Stewardship Assistance, Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 1037 (1978) (private purposes of organization's clients precludes exemption); Lake Petersburg Assn. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M.
(CCH) 259 (1974) (social welfare exemption denied where direct benefit of lake facility was
only for members). See generally B. HOPKINS, supra note 1, at 47, 49-50, 158-76.
71. 4 A. Scarr, supra note 38, § 376, at 2965.
72. See notes 92-94 infra and accompanying text.
73. Compare Rev. Rul. 80-301, 1980-2 C.B. 181, with Rev. Ru!. 80-302, 1980-2 C.B. 182.
Rev. Ru!. 80-301 declared that a genealogical society with open membership is charitable because it educates the public. In Rev. Ru!. 80-302, a similar organization that limited its scope
to a particular family was denied charitable status, because the primary benefit was to private
interests. People are educated in both cases, which is a recognized charitable purpose. In the
latter ruling, however, the family would be likely to pursue the activity for its own education
without public support through the tax law.
An organization operating for the mutual benefit of its members that is denied charitable
status may still be eligible for tax exemption under another Code provision. For a discussion
of mutual benefit organizations, see note 105 infra.
74. See, e.g., Ottawa Silica Co. v. United States, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9308, at
83780 (Ct. Cl. 1982) ("Those benefits that inure to the general public from charitable contributions are incidental to the contribution, and the donor, as a member of the general public, may
receive them."); Dumaine Farms v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 650, 670-71 (1980) (benefits to
settlor of scientific and educational trust same as those available to the general public).
15. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 8, at 305 n.15.
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factfinder should compare the benefits that the organizers receive
with those that the community-at-large receives. If the organizers
receive benefits substantially greater than, or significantly different
from, the benefits accruing to the community-at-large, strong evidence exists that the activity violates the private-gain prohibition. 76
The second criterion that must be met before an entity can be
considered a social welfare and thus charitable organization,
namely, that the entity's activities benefit the community in some
76. Some courts and the Service have disagreed over exactly what extrinsic evidence indicates that those responsible for the operation of an organization have received substantially
greater or different benefits from the public-at-large. In Eden Hall Farm v. United States, 389
F. Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1975), the Service contended that a trust fund created under the will of
a former employee of the H.J. Heinz Company, for the purpose of operating a recreational
facility, was not a social welfare organization. The Service pointed to Heinz corporation involvement in trust administration and to statistics showing that 80% of those who used the
facility were Heinz employees, factors the Service said suggested that the trust operated for
private purposes. See Rev. Rul. 80-205, 1980-2 C.B. 184, 185 (Service non-acquiescence in
Eden Hall). The court rejected the Service's contentions and approved social welfare status. It
noted that "there is no evidence of domination, control or management by the Heinz Company," 389 F. Supp. at 863, and that the limited invitational procedure to select beneficiaries of
the facility had a valid purpose. 389 F. Supp. at 866.
In Monterey Public Parking Corp. v. United States, 321 F.Supp. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1970),
qffd., 481 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1973), the court upheld charitable and social welfare status for a
corporation operating a parking facility that served a commercial area of the community. The
government argued against charitable status, claiming that the activity was conducted for private purposes. 321 F. Supp. at 975. The government also objected to social welfare status,
claiming that " 'carrying on a business with the general public in a manner similar to organizations organized for profit'" precluded exemption. 321 F. Supp. at 974 (quoting Treas. Reg.
§ l.50l(c)(4)-l (1959)). The government pointed to special privileges granted to busini:sses that
supported the activity as evidence of private purposes. 321 F. Supp. at 974. The court acknowledged that the same concern underlies both I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) and (4) (1982). It stated:
[I]f this Court were convinced that plaintiff's organizers, by giving themselves special advertising rights, or by restricting the validation stamp system to certain businesses, were in
fact primarily interested in their own ends rather than in those of the public, exemption
under neither (c)(4) nor (c)(3) would be possible.
389 F. Supp. at 975. Thus, the court rejected the evidence of private motive offered by the
government, noting that the privileges were available to nonorganizers of the corporation as
well as the organization that had arranged and financed the corporation. The court found:
Plaintiff's organizers were also undeniably benefited. But this benefit is indistinguishable
from that which inhered to the community as a whole. . . .
Plaintiff has none of the indicia by which Courts have exposed bad faith attempts to take
advantage of§ 501: no dividends for private persons, no under the table distributions of
assets, no advertising advantages or special prices for a privileged few. The business activity itself is similar to that which others engage in for private profit, but it is not carried
on in the same manner; it is carried on only because it is necessary for the attainment of
an undeniably public end.
389 F. Supp. at 976, 977. But see Rev. Rul. 78-86, 1978-1 C.B. 152 (Service non-acquiescence
in Monterey).
For examples of cases where an examination of the objective evidence revealed self-interest, see Ottawa Silica Co. v. United States, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9308, at 83780 (Ct. Cl.
1982) (court found that benefits from a taxpayer's contribution of land ''were substantial
enough to provide [taxpayer] with a quidpro quo for the transfer and thus effectively destroyed
the charitable nature of the transfer."); Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. v. Commissioner, 79
T.C. 793, 805 (1982) (copyright servicing center denied charitable status since "there is little
persuasive evidence that petitioner's founders had interests of any substance beyond the creation of a device to protect their copyright ownership and collect license fees").
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way,77 derives from the legal meaning of "charity."78 Current law
conditions classification as a social welfare or charitable organization on some showing of benefit to the community.79 Under the approach proposed here, however, no attempt would be made to
classify an entity as either a social welfare or charitable organization
based on the amount of community benefits that it produced. so The
community-benefit requirement suggested by this Note recognizes
that benefits to the community cannot be quantified. 81 Therefore, it
simply requires some showing that the activity in question generates
net social benefits as opposed to net social costs and, relatedly, does
not operate for a purpose contrary to public policy. 82 Groups that
operated "for the promotion of social welfare" 83 and satisfied this
community-benefit requirement as well as the private-gain prohibition would qualify as social welfare organizations, and hence charitable organizations as well.
The abolition of the distinction between charitable and social
welfare organizations proposed here would not render subsection
77. Note that the co=unity-benefit requirement is entirely distinct from the private-gain
prohibition. See Christian Stewardship Assistance, Inc. v. Co=issioner, 70 T.C. 1037, 1042
(1978) (rejecting contention that private purpose must be weighed against the public benefits
derived therefrom; substantial private purpose alone disqualifies). q. Rev. Rul. 81-116, 19811 C.B. 333 (parking facility that granted "participating merchants" special benefits was not
operated exclusively for public purposes; it served participating merchants' private interests).
The courts' treatment of charitable contributions also illustrates that the requirement of
community benefit is not a factor in the private purpose determination. See, e.g., Ottawa Silica Co v. United States, 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9308, at 83780 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (taxpayer
denied charitable deduction for donation of land for a public high school where court found
donation was made in anticipation of benefits to taxpayer from construction of school; "a
contribution made to a charity is not made for public purposes if the donor receives, or anticipates receiving, a substantial benefit in return").
78. See notes 35-38 supra and accompanying text.
79. See note 18 supra.
80. See notes 18-19supra and accompanying text. Under the approach suggested here, the
organization denied charitable status in Rev. Rul. 78-384, 1978-2 C.B. 174, discussed at note 19
supra, would not be denied such status on the ground that it generated insufficient benefits to
the co=unity, so long as it did produce co=unity benefits. The possibility exists, however,
that this organization could still be denied charitable status through operation of the privategain prohibition.
81. See notes 57-65 supra and accompanying text.
82. "A corollary to the public benefit principle is the requirement, long recognized in the
law of trusts, that the purpose of a charitable trust may not be illegal or violate established
public policy. . . . (A]n institution must fall within a category specified . . . and must demonstrably serve and be in harmony with the public interest." Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
103 S. Ct. 2017, 2028, 2029 (1983) (holding that universities with racially discriminatory admissions policies may be denied charitable status). Where an organization is organized or operated for purposes contrary to public policy, the organization generates net social costs rather
than net social benefits and should be denied charitable status. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-384,
1975-2 C.B. 204 (peace organization that advocated civil disobedience to protest war denied
charitable and social welfare status); Rev. Rul. 67-325, 1967-2 C.B. 113 (organization providing free recreational facilities but with race restriction denied charitable and social welfare
status).
83. I.R.C. § 50l(c)(4) (1982).

December 1983]

Note -

Social Welfare Organizations

531

50l(c)(4) meaningless, however. 84 Even if social welfare organizations were recognized as charitable under subsection 501(c)(3), subsection 50l(c)(4) would continue to exempt "action organizations"
from taxation. "Action organizations" are social welfare organizations that attempt to influence legislation, 85 and therefore do not
qualify for the tax exemption for charitable organizations provided
by subsection 50l(c)(3).86 Thus, subsection 50l(c)(4) would continue
to exempt some organizations not covered under 50l(c)(3), which
may be its only congressionally recognized function. 87 In any event,
the Service should not deny charitable status to social welfare organizations in hght of the ample evidence that Congress intended that
they be included within the charitable category. 88

B. Advantages of the Proposal
1. Elimination

ofArbitrary Results

Under the proposed approach, the Service and courts would employ two concepts, the private-gain prohibition and the communitybenefit requirement, that they already use in classifying social welfare and charitable organizations. 89 The proposed approach recognizes, however, that all90 social welfare organizations should come
under the category of charitable organizations as well. The distinction between the two types of organizations that the Service presum84. Courts should not construe a statute so that a section is not given effect. See Jarecki v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1961); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 53839 (1955).
85. See Treas. Reg. §§ I.50I(c)(3)-l(c)(3), l.501(c)(4)-l(a)(2)(ii) (1959); see also note 4
supra.
86. See Treas. Reg. § l.50I(c)(3)-l(c)(3) (1959).
87. Although it is unclear why Congress originally added the exemption for social welfare
organizations contained in subsection 501(c)(4), see notes 39-41 supra and accompanying text,
Congress has since clearly recognized the role of this provision in providing a tax exemption
for action organizations, which cannot qualify for charitable status. See note 4 supra. This
congressional recognition is apparent in the enactment of other Code provisions that limit the
circumstances where action organizations may claim exemption under subsection 50I(c)(4).
I.R.C. § 501(h) (1982) denies charitable status to organizations that make expenditures on
political lobbying in excess of a certain amount. Further, I.R.C. § 504 (1982) prevents an
organization that has lost its charitable exemption under subsection 501(c)(3) due to substantial lobbying from thereafter claiming an exemption as a social welfare organization under
subsection 501(c)(4). A 1976 Senate report discussing the addition of these provisions refers
twice to the current regulations under subsection 50I(c)(4), which are discussed at note 4supra.
See S. REP. No. 938 (Pt. II), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 80 n.l, 83, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4030, 4105, 4107-08. According to the report, Congress passed section 504
to prevent a charitable organization from building up an endowment financed out of deductible contributions before operating as a lobbying organization under subsection 501(c)(4)
(1976), an abuse that the prior regulations had allowed. See id. at 83, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 4107-08.
88. See notes 29-41 supra and accompanying text.
89. See notes 17-19, 69-70, & 77 supra and accompanying text.
90. That is, except for "political" social welfare organizations, i.e., "action organizations."
See notes 4 & 84-87 supra and accompanying text.
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ably now makes on the basis of the amount of community benefits
produced by each leads to arbitrary and unpredictable results in
classification. 91 Replacement of the Service's apparent quantification
approach with a simple requirement that an organization's activities
benefit the community would eliminate these arbitrary and unpredictable results.
2. Increase in the Social Advantages That Justify Deductible
Contributions

This Note's proposal would further the policies that led Congress
to encourage the formation and conduct of charitable organizations.
The existence of such organizations is considered desirable for two
reasons. First, activities of charitable organizations generate benefits
for the community. In the absence of these organizations, either the
government would have to conduct these activities to generate such
benefits or the community would go without them. Second, the
existence of numerous private charitable organizations fosters pluralism, widespread voluntary participation, and decentralized
decisionmaking.
Congress supports charitable organizations and helps realize
these goals by exempting such organizations from taxation and allowing donors to deduct contributions to such organizations. This
government backing encourages the private sector to form additional
charitable organizations or expand those already in existence. In
either event, the result is that more charitable activities are conducted by private organizations. To the extent that such activities
had not been previously conducted, government support of charitable organizations generates greater benefits for the community. 92
Moreover, charitable activities conducted by private organizations
may displace a governmental agency that had provided similar serv91. See notes 57-65 supra and accompanying text.
92. In a recent case, the Supreme Court noted that through making contributions to charitable organizations deductible, "Congress sought ... to encourage the development of private
institutions that serve a useful public purpose or supplement or take the place of public institutions of the same kind." Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2026 (1983); see
also M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 8, ~ 7.01, at 142 ("[I]t might be expected that, unless deductible, charitable gifts would shrink to offset a portion of the donor's tax liabilities, and the scope
of philanthropic activities would necessarily contract."). With respect to tax exemptions for
charitable organizations, the Court observed: "Charitable exemptions are justified on the basis
that the exempt entity confers a public benefit - a benefit which the society or the community
may not itself choose or be able to provide, or which supplements and advances the work of
public institutions already supported by tax revenues." 103 S. Ct. at 2028.
In addition, a congressional report discussing the deduction provision noted that "the Government is compensated for the loss of [tax] revenue by its relief from financial burden which
would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by the promotion of
the general welfare." H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938).
See also Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924); St. Louis
Union Trust Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d 427, 432 (8th Cir. 1967).
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ices. 93 In these ways, government support of charitable organizations through the tax law fosters pluralism, voluntarism, and
decentralized decisionmaking.9 4
Any organization that satisfies the two criteria for charitable status proposed by this Note would further these policies. First, the
private-gain prohibition ensures that charitable organizations conduct activities that the private sector might not otherwise provide. If
an activity is sufficiently profitable to induce persons to engage in it
without government support, the private-gain prohibition should
prevent an organization conducting that activity from attaining charitable status. 95 The private-gain prohibition thus focuses the government support provided by the tax law on those organizations that
might not exist without it, and in this way encourages diversity and
voluntary participation. 96 Second, the community-benefit requirement motivates organizations to respond to the particular needs of a
community.97 This criterion thereby inspires innovative, decentral93. See note 92 supra. In addition, Hopkins notes:
Clearly then, the exemption for charitable organizations is a derivative of the concept that
they perform functions which, in the organizations' absence, government would have to
perform; therefore, government is willing to forego the otherwise tax revenues in return
for the public services rendered.
B. HOPKINS, supra note l, at 5. Recently, Congress expressed a similar sentiment when it
explained its passage of the charitable deduction for non-itemizers contained in I.R.C. § 170(i)
(1982):
The Congress believed that allowing a charitable deduction to nonitemizers stimulates
charitable giving, thereby providing more funds for worthwhile nonprofit organizations,
many of which provide services that otherwise might have to be provided by the Federal
Government.
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981 at 49 (Comm. Print 1981), reprinted in 1980-1981
INTERNAL REVENUE Acrs, at 1369, 1423 (1982).
94. In his concurring opinion in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983),
Justice Powell alluded to "the important role played by tax exemptions in encouraging diverse,
indeed often sharply conflicting, activities and viewpoints." 103 S. Ct. at 2038 (Powell, J., concurring). "[T]he provision of tax exemptions to nonprofit groups is one indispensable means of
limiting the influence of governmental orthodoxy on important areas of community life." 103
S. Ct. at 2038 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). See also B. HOPKINS,supra note l, at
6-8; Rainey & Henshaw, supra note 13, at 240 (Private decisionmaking provides "innovative,
creative, involvement in areas as yet too sensitive for government exploration."). Specifically,
Hopkins observes:
Charitable organizations are regarded as fostering voluntarism and pluralism in the
American social order. That is, society is regarded as benefiting not only from the application of private wealth to specific purposes in the public interest but also from the variety
of choices made by individual philanthropists as to which activities to further. This decentralized choice-making is arguably more efficient and responsive to public needs than
the cumbersome and less flexible allocation process of government administration.
B. HOPKINS, supra note l, at 7 (citations omitted).
95. See notes 68-73 supra and accompanying text.
96. See notes 92-94 supra and accompanying text.
97. For example, the tax breaks afforded by charitable status may encourage the formation
of a credit counseling service that, among other activities, provides aid to the non-poor. See
Consumer Credit Counseling Serv., Inc. v. United States, 78-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ~ 9660
(D.D.C. 1978). The court here held that a credit counseling service was charitable. The Service had considered this activity worthy only of social welfare status. See Rev. Rul. 65-299,
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ized decisionmaking, and enhances the prospects for pluralistic input
in addressing a community's problems.
Because the approach advocated by this Note recognizes social
welfare organizations as charitable, greater community benefits
would flow from activities encouraged by the deductibility of charitable contributions. 98 Since social welfare organizations satisfy the
private-gain prohibition99 and meet the community-benefit test even
under the fUITent approach apparently followed by the Service, 100
their existence serves the goals of pluralism, voluntarism, and decentralized decisionmaking like that of any charitable organization. 101
By denying social welfare organizations charitable status, the Service
causes the public to forgo the additional benefits that social welfare
organizations as a whole would produce if they, like charitable organizations, could receive deductible contributions. Extension of the
deduction provision to social welfare organizations would result in
the expansion of these organizations' current activities or lead to the
formation of new social welfare organizations. This Note's proposal
seeks to provide communities with the additional benefits that
greater social welfare organization activity would generate by granting. such organizations charitable status and thus making them eligible to receive deductible contributions.
Finally, the proposal set forth here should guarantee that only
those organizations for which deductibility is appropriate would
qualify as charitable. The private-gain prohibition would continue
to exclude from charitable status those organizations that conduct
activities for private benefit. Among the organizations disqualified
from charitable status by the private-gain prohibition are many that
subsection 50l(c) already exempts from taxation, such as business
leagues, 102 labor organizations, 103 and social clubs. 104 Although Congress has granted tax exemptions to these organizations, such exemptions rest on policies different from the reasons underlying tax
exemption and deductible contributions for charitable organizations.105 Making contributions to non-charitable organizations de1965-2 C.B. 165. For further illustrations of the variety of community services that charitable
status may inspire, see the rulings cited in notes 14-16 supra.
Hopkins notes the similar policy behind the charitable and social welfare exemptions: both
tax relief measures are granted in recognition of community benefit. See B. HOPKINS, supra
note 1, at 5-14.
98. See notes 92-93 supra and accompanying text.
99. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
100. See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text.
101. See note 94 supra and accompanying text.
102. See I.R.C. § 50l(c)(6} (1982).
103. See I.R.C. § 50l(c)(5} (1982).
104. See I.R.C. § 50l(c)(7} (1982).
105. Charitable and social welfare organizations, exempt from taxation under subsections
50l(c)(3) and (4), are both "public service" organizations. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note
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ductible is not necessary to encourage the operation of such
organizations, even though their activities may be beneficial to the
community. Sufficient private incentive already exists to encourage
the operation of such organizations, and further government support
through the tax law would be a windfall.
CONCLUSION

Despite opposition from the courts, the Service continues to distinguish between charitable and social welfare organizations under
subsections 501(c)(3) and (4) of the Code. An examination of the
legislative history of the statutory predecessors of these current provisions, however, reveals that the separate enumeration of the two
organizations was not intended to exclude social welfare organizations from the charitable category. Moreover, the Service's attempts
to draw such a distinction have failed, leading to arbitrary and unpredictable outcomes in classification. Therefore, the Service should
recognize social welfare organizations as cha.ritable, since such organizations, like charitable organizations, by definition do not operate
for private gain and do benefit the community in some way. This
approach would eliminate the unhappy results now produced by the
Service's attempts to distinguish between social welfare and charitable organizations, and would further the policies of pluralism, volun8, at 305. These public service organizations are distinct from other organizations exempted
from taxation under subsection 50l(c), such as business leagues, labor organizations, and social clubs, which are termed "mutual benefit" organizations. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra
note 8, at 306; see also Rev. Rul. 75-199, 1975-1 C.B. 160 (social welfare organizations distinguished from mutual benefit organizations).
Public service organizations "serve the interests of society in a broad sense, ordinarily without economic benefit to their organizers or benefactors." Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 8, at
302. They are exempt from income taxation because they "do not realize 'income' in the ordinary sense of that term[,] [so] there is no satisfactory way to fit the tax rate to the ability of the
beneficiaries to pay." Id at 305. The category of public service organizations includes only
subsection 50l(c)(3) charitable organizations and subsection 50l(c)(4) social welfare organizations and political parties. See id. at 305.
Mutual benefit organizations, unlike public service organizations, operate primarily for the
economic benefit of their members. These organizations "are 'nonprofit' only in the limited sense that they do not engage in business with the general public for the benefit of investors" in the organization. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 8, at 302 (footnote omitted). Thus, the
private-gain prohibition does not apply to mutual benefit organizations. See note 68 supra. As
a result, mutual benefit organizations, unlike public service organizations, do not further the
tax policies underlying deductible contributions. See notes 95-96 supra and accompanying
text. The benefits provided to the members of such an organization provide sufficient incentive for the operation of the organization, so deductible contributions are not necessary to the
organization's continued existence. Thus, this Note recognizes that mutual benefit organizations should not be eligible for deductible contributions. In addition, tax exemption for these
organizations is grounded on considerations different from those underlying exemption of
public service organizations. For an explanation of these considerations, see Bittker &
Rahdert, supra note 8, at 348-55; B. HOPKINS, supra note 1, at 14-15.
For some examples of mutual benefit organizations, see Rev. Rul. 74-553, 1974-2 C.B. 168
(medical association peer review board qualifies as subsection 50l(c)(6) business league); Rev.
Rul. 69-632, 1969-2 C.B. 120 (industry research association qualifies as subsection 50l(c)(6)
business league).
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tarism, and decentralized decisionmaking encouraged by the special
tax advantages accorded charitable organizations.

